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A CRITICAL VIEW OF TRADITIONAL TAX POLICY
THEORY: A PRAGMATIC ALTERNATIVE
NANCY E. SHURTZt
I. INTRODUCTION
XISTING tax policy taken as a whole is inarticulable and theo-
retically incoherent, and thus, in effect, an obstacle to effec-
tive tax reform. To develop a tax policy useful in the
development of a tax system, the theoretical approach to taxation
must be abandoned and a pragmatic approach must be adopted.
Since the inauguration of the income tax in 1913, the tax system
has been in a constant state of change. The tax code has been the
object of endless analysis. Several major tax reform acts and in-
numerable minor revisions have been enacted to improve it.I Yet
despite these efforts at reform-or perhaps because of them-it is
less clear now than ever before precisely what federal income tax
policy is; and the tax code, the visible manifestation of that policy,
has grown increasingly complex. 2 It should therefore be clear
that there will never be successful tax reform, reform which re-
sults in an acceptable and essentially completed tax code, one un-
needful of and resistant to continual further reform, until there is
tax policy reform resulting in a normative tax policy.3 Moreover,
it should be apparent that if there is to be a truly normative in-
come tax policy, it is only going to be achieved by taking a differ-
ent approach from that which has been pursued in the past. What
this means, and what approach to income tax policy is necessary
in order to effect successful long-term tax reform, are the focus of
this article.
The theses of this article are: 1) the present income tax sys-
t Professor, University of Oregon School of Law; J.D. Ohio State, LL.M.
Georgetown. I would like to thank David Knapp for his contributions to this
article.
1. For a collection of the major tax reform acts and minor revisions since
1954, see generallyJ. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1942 &
Supp.).
2. The incredible complexity of the federal income tax system is a source of
annoyance and frustration to all. FEDERAL INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION 3-5 (C.
Gustafson ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Gustafson]. As the system grows even
more complex, the taxpayer's ability to comply becomes less predictable and
enforcement becomes less uniform. Id. at 4.
3. A normative tax policy is one that is useful in formulating a tax code,
because it is coherent and articulable.
(1665)
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tem is flawed because it is not based on a normative tax policy;
2) a normative tax policy requires abandonment of the traditional
theoretical approach to taxation and adoption of a pragmatic ap-
proach and 3) a pragmatic approach must be adopted employing
as its primary guiding principle the efficient collection of revenue
and employing empirical data to measure whether these revenue
goals are being met. This article explores this pragmatic alterna-
tive, and considers the effects on the tax base, tax unit and tax
rates of such an alternative.
II. TRADITIONAL THEORETICAL APPROACH
Because it is incumbent upon tax policy to guide tax system
reform, tax policy itself must be reformed first. Fortunately, it is
not necessary to identify what is specifically wrong with the tax
code to understand and correct the shortcomings of past policy.
Nor is it necessary to undertake a comprehensive review of past
policy to understand how the present tax policy and code evolved
into their present condition. 4 The shortcomings in federal in-
come tax policy are the direct result of the approach traditionally
taken by the tax specialists instrumental in its development.
The traditional theoretical approach to tax policy formula-
tion has not been useful as a guide to actual decision making. To
be useful, it must be well-articulated and theoretically coherent.
It must be articulated so that it can provide guidance for reform
and contribute stability to the resultant scheme. If the tax policy
is unclear, it will be impossible to codify that policy. Further-
more, vagueness in tax policy will result in the tax system being
subject to endless revision as one or another tenet of policy is
pushed to dominance by potential beneficiaries of the ensuing
"corrections" to the code. For similar reasons, tax policy must be
coherent. In other words, regardless of which tenets of taxation
are determined to be important, it is essential that they be forged
into some overall order or be given determinable weights. It is
unrealistic to believe that a tax policy which contains unresolved
4. See, e.g., Karson, Tax Expenditures and Tax Reform, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1397
(1985). The author remarks upon how "[i]t has become standard political rhet-
oric to hurl accusations of complexity at the income tax system." Id. at 1402; see
also A.B.A. Sec. of Tax'n Committee on Basic Tax Structure and Simplification,
Bradley-Gephardt and Kemp-Kasten Bills, 38 TAx LAw. 381 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as A.B.A. Sec.]. The report notes that two causes of the "current complexity"
are provisions narrowing the tax base and taxpayer avoidance of high marginal
rates. Id. at 386.
1666 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1665
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cross-purposes can ever be sufficiently well-defined to be useful in
developing a tax structure.
Simply stated, traditional tax policy criteria are not normative
for two reasons. First, the criteria are primarily conceptual in na-
ture; their meaning is subject to differing interpretations and are
not useful as a guide to real world decision making. Second, the
tax policy criteria are theoretically inconsistent.
The traditional approach to tax policy is a theoretical one.
One of the major tenets of traditional tax theory has been that
there are a multitude of general and specific purposes that should
be served by the tax system.5 The general purposes can be bro-
ken down into seven categories: 1) to finance government ex-
penditures; 2) to achieve a practical and workable income tax
system; 3) to promote stability and economic growth; 4) to im-
pose equal taxes upon those who enjoy equal incomes; 5) to
refuce economic inequality; 6) to minimize interference with the
operation of an efficient economy and 7) to develop a tax system
consistent with the Constitution and the political system.6 For
simplicity, we can designate these purposes or criteria as follows:
revenue-raising; administerability; stability; horizontal equity;
vertical equity; neutrality and political order.7 In addition to
these general purposes, traditional tax theorists agree that the tax
system has been used to create special incentives.8 Thus, for ex-
ample, the tax system has been used to promote charities, 9 energy
5. See Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567
(1965). The themes that have dominated tax policy formulations in the past
(equity and efficiency) have also been relied upon in the present. See JOINT COM-
MITrEE ON TAXATION, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: RATE
STRUCTURE AND OTHER INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX ISSUES 1-9 (1985); see also Federal
Taxation as an Instrument of Social and Economic Policy, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 431 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Taxation].
6. These purposes have been labelled by Sneed as "macro-criteria."
Sneed, supra note 5, at 568. The author sets up the following guidelines useful
to governments in designing their tax systems: 1) the base upon which a tax is
levied "should consist of stable and easily identifiable features of the social and
economic order;" 2) the structure and burden of a tax should be "sufficiently
light and compatible to prevent substantial distortion of those features which
constitute the base;" 3) the "pain of paying taxes should neither be maximized
nor eliminated;" 4) "use of the taxing power to encourage or discourage specific
conduct... [should be done intelligently and with] restraint" and 5) the alloca-
tion of the tax burden should reflect the goals of the "dominant groups." Id. at
567.
7. For a discussion of these criteria, see infra notes 49-50 and accompanying
text.
8. See generally Smith, Analysis of Factors Limiting Taxable Capacity, in THE LIM-
ITS OF TAXABLE CAPACITY 10 (1953) (symposium conducted by Tax Institute,
Princeton, N.J.).
9. Anthoine, Deductions for Charitable Contributions of Appreciated Property-The
166719861
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production' and a healthy environment."'
The general tax policy criteria describe in vague terms the
effects of income taxation which must ultimately be balanced in a
stable tax system. But they do not facilitate the determination of
what elements ought to be combined to produce that system.
There is no meaningful way in which traditional tax theorists can
judge whether the theoretical tenets that they identify are in fact
valid tenets of tax policy. There are no positive indicators of
when a tenet of tax policy needs to be rethought.' 2 The funda-
mental flaw in the traditional approach is that the general tax pol-
icy criteria are too diffuse to serve the purpose of translating
goals into a tax code.
Traditional tax policy is not normative because no agreement
Art World, 35 TAX. L. REV. 239 (1980); Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deduc-
tions or Matching Grants? 28 TAX. L. REV. 37 (1972); Bittker, The Property and Vital-
ity of a Federal Income Tax Deduction for Private Philanthropy, in TAX IMPACTS ON
PHILANTHROPY (1972) (Princeton, N.J. Tax Institute of America); Break, Charita-
ble Contributions under the Federal Individual Income Tax: Alternative Policy Options, in
THREE RESEARCH PAPERS (1977) (sponsored by the Comm'n of Private Philan-
thropy and Public Needs, Dep't of Treasury); Feldstein, The Income Tax and Chari-
table Contributions: Part II- The Impact on Religious, Educational and Other
Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 209 (1975); Galston, Public Policy Constraints on
Charitable Organizations, 3 VA. TAX. REV. 29 (1984); Rabin, Charitable Trusts and
Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 912 (1966),
10. G. BRANNON, STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY (1975); Blatz, The Impact of
Current Tax Reform Proposals on the Oil an Gas Industry, 33 OIL & GAS TAX Q 628
(1985); Landis, The Impact of the Income Tax Laws on the Energy Crisis: Oil and Con-
gress Don't Mix, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1040 (1976).
11. Avins, Tax Incentives and Pollution: The Need for Hysteria Control, 58 A.B.A.
J. 54 (1972); S. Lazzari, An Economic Evaluation of Federal Tax Credits for Residential
Energy Conservation, in 7 STUDIES IN TAXATION, PUBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUB-
JECTS-A COMPENDIUM 82 (1983) (Washington, D.C. Fund for Public Policy Re-
search); McDaniel & Kaplinsky, The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to Combat
Air and Water Pollution: A Case Study in Tax Expenditures, 112 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 351 (1971). In addition, the tax code has been used: 1) to preserve histori-
cal buildings, Fergenbaum & Thomas, Govoernment Incentives for Historic Preserva-
tion, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1984); 2) to promote agriculture, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, SPECIAL
ESTATE TAX PROVISIONS FOR FARMERS SHOULD BE SIMPLIFIED TO ACHIEVE FAIR
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS (1981); Davenport, The Influence of Tax Policy on Agri-
culture, 10 TAX NOTES 603 (1980); 3) to subsidize health care, Manuel, Tax Subsi-
dies for Health Care Examined, 10 TAX NOTES 346 (1980); Steverle & Hoffman, Tax
Expenditures For Health Care, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 101 (1979) and 4) to encourage
science, Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
171 (1965). The tax code has also been proposed as a solution to urban
problems, Stone, Tax Incentives as a Solution to Urban Problems, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 647 (1969), as well as a solution to population control, Mirrlees, Population
Policy and Taxation of Family Size, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 169 (1972).
12. When a particular code provision is abused by taxpayers or is the sub-
ject of unfavorable court rulings, the IRS knows to revise or delete it. A major
theme of this article is that before such action is taken more empirical evidence
must be gathered to determine whether the system is working properly.
1668 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1665
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exists as to the meaning of the criteria. While there is general
agreement in the law and literature that the general criteria
should be used in analyzing the tax structure, there is strong disa-
greement over the applied meaning of the criteria. Perhaps the
meaning of horizontal equity has generated the most controversy.
Horizontal equity can be generally defined as requiring that per-
sons with substantially the same income pay the same tax.13
While tax theorists agree that those who are equal should bear
equal tax burdens, they disagree as to how to establish who is
equal. Traditionally, "income" has been the basis for comparing
equality, however, there is little agreement as to the proper defi-
nition of income.14 Historically, tax specialists have considered a
"good" definition of income to be the "indispensable intellectual
foundation" of tax policy, and thus they searched for an intellectual
definition. 15 However, it was not easy to devise a workable defini-
tion of income.' 6 Nevertheless, most American tax specialists
have accepted a theoretical economic definition known as the
Haig-Simons definition, which states that income is "the sum of
consumption and the change in value of property."' 7 In short,
"income" for theoretical tax policy purposes is the sum of con-
sumption and accumulation.'
Much of tax policy debate over the years has focused on the
Haig-Simons definition of income. For example, the comprehen-
13. See Gustafson, supra note 2, at 122. Examples of the effect of horizontal
equity are the income averaging provisions. Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305
(West Supp. 1986) (income averaging provision; § 1301 eliminated by Tax Re-
form act of 1986).
14. See, e.g.,Jones, The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action in Employ-
ment: Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70 IOWA L. REV. 901, 935 (1985). Pro-
fessor Jones uses income as one basis of comparing equality among individuals
of diverse race, gender and ethnicities. Id. (citing Cain, The Economics of Discrimi-
nation: Part I, in Focus 1, 2 (Summer 1984) (University of Wisconsin, Madison
Institute for Research on Poverty)).
15. Goode, The Economic Definition of Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX-
ATION 2 (J. Pechman ed. 1977).
16. Id. at 1-2. Nicholas Kaldor warned that the problems of defining individ-
ual income, quite apart from any problem of practical measurement, appear in
principle unsolvable. N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 20 (1955).
17. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (1986) (citing H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
206 (1938) ("[~lncome . . .may be defined as the algebraic sum of the individ-
ual's consumption expense and accumulation during the accounting period.
Taxable income ... is ... in the language of Professor Haig, a measure of 'the
net accretion of one's economic power between two points in time'....")).
18. Even Henry Simons said "[t]hat it should be possible to delimit the con-
cept [of income] precisely in every direction is hardly to be expected," and
noted "insuperable difficulties to achievement of a rigorous conception of per-
sonal income." H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 43, 110 (1938).
19861 1669
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sive tax base debate of the 1960's' 9 was an attempt at a definition
of income that would be rational, and would provide equality of
tax treatment among taxpayers when applied.20 But what does
the Haig-Simons definition contribute with respect to the design,
implementation, or administration of a real tax systems-one that
actually generates revenue to offset government expenditures?
The answer is, unfortunately, nothing but complexity. 2' Because
it is theoretical, the Haig-Simons definition cannot be used in any
income tax equation. 22 Accordingly, two other definitions of in-
come, "gross income" 23 and "taxable income,"2 4 have been cre-
ated in order to administer the tax system, neither of which
conforms with the Haig-Simons definition. In fact, in trying to
apply the Haig-Simons definition, tax theorists have created the
widest possible gap between the definition of income for tax pol-
icy purposes and what actually is taxed, or "taxable income."2 5
One commentator has written that "any relation of taxable in-
come to economic income must be put down as largely coinciden-
tal." 2 6 Unfortunately, the sole function of that "reality gap" thus
far has been to provide room for academics to debate, politicians
to maneuver, and special interests to manipulate tax policy.2 7
19. This renewed an earlier debate. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS (1959); W.
VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1947).
20. Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1032
(1968); Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REV. 795 (196); Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax
Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1016
(1968); Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1967);
Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1967).
21. Boris Bittker summarized the comprehensive tax base debate by stating
that the concept of fairness cannot be defined in unambiguous terms. See gener-
ally Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HAIRv. L.
REV. 795 (1967).
22. Louis Eisenstein noted that any definition of income only succeeds in
reflecting personal preference or ideologies, and that "no larger wisdom is dis-
cernible." L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 193, 197-98 (1961).
23. Broadly defined, "gross income" is income less income exempt from
tax. Prentice-Hall 1986 Federal Tax Handbook (P-H) 1201 (1986) [hereinafter cited
as Prentice-Hall]; R. LINDHOLM, A NEW FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 80 (1984); see also
I.R.C. § 61 (West Supp. 1986) (defining gross income).
24. Deductions allowed by law are subtracted from gross income to find
"taxable income," i.e., "adjusted gross income." See I.R.C. § 62 (West Supp.
1986); Prentice-Hall, supra note 23, at 1201.
25. Ideologies coalesce to fashion a tax system that provides economic as
well as political stability. SeeJ. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT
OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952).
26. R. LINDHOLM, supra note 23, at 80; see also Lindholm, A New Federalist Tax
System, 24 TAX NOTES 492 (1984).
27. As Louis Eisenstein states, "[o]ur income tax is doomed to be an elabo-
6
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Hence, nothing could be less conducive to the development of a
well-articulated, coherent tax policy or tax system than the Haig-
Simons theoretical definition of income.
Another controversial criteria is that of vertical equity. The
goal of vertical equity is to insure that persons who have larger
incomes pay greater amounts of tax. Thus, to some extent, verti-
cal equity is to be determined by the difference in income be-
tween individual taxpayers.28 Tax theorists generally agree that
each taxpayer should contribute his or her "fair share" to the cost
of government.2 9 No agreement exists as to how the term "fair
share" should be defined; there are those who believe a "fair
share" is determined proportionately by a flat rate,30 while others
believe in some kind of progression.3' To date, "fair share" has
been set within an ability-to-pay framework,32 with ability-to-pay
being defined as the "capacity for paying without undue hardship
on the part of the person paying or an unacceptable degree of
interference with objectives that are considered socially important
by other members of the community."33 Because there are no
objective criteria pursuant to which differences in ability to pay
can be taken into account, the ability-to-pay concept is so ambigu-
rate hodge podge as long as it represents an uneasy compromise among con-
testing interests." L. EISENSTEIN, supra note 22, at 455. As Rep. Dan
Rostenkowski, D-Ill., Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee says,
"[t]ax reform, like all massive changes in policy, is negotiated, not dictated. Like
it or not, tax reform ends up a series of compromises. No compromises, no
reform .... Birnbaum, Rostenkowski Says Tax Bill Is To Be Ready This Month,
Rejects Reagan's Criticism, Wall St.J., Nov. 8, 1985, at 54, col. 1.
28. See Beaudry, The Flat Rate Tax: Is It a Viable Solution to the Crisis Facing the
Internal Revenue Code?, 9 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 219, 226 (1984). Vertical equity
results in progressive tax rates. Gustafson, supra note 2, at 122.
29. Kiefer, Distributional Tax Progressivity Indexes, 37 NAT'L TAX. J. 497 (1984);
J. PECHMAN, WHO PAID THE TAXES, 1966-85 (1985); J. PECHMAN & B. OKNER,
WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? (1974).
30. A.B.A. Sec., supra note 4, at 381; Berger, In Behalf of a Single Rate Flat
Tax, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 993 (1985); Guttman, The Single-Rate Income Tax: Policy
Questions and Technical Issues, 21 TAX NOTES 539 (1983); R. HALL & A. REBUSHKA,
Low TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX (1983); Henkle, Flat Rate Taxes, 26 TAX NOTES
83 (1985); Manuel, How About A Flat-Rate Income Tax?, 6 TAX NOTES 662 (1978);
McLennza, Practical Issues Raised by Proposals for a Flat-Rate Tax, in NTA-TIA, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 109 (1982).
31. A. Atkinson, How Progressive Should the Income Tax Be? in ESSAYS IN MOD-
ERN ECONOMICS (M. Parkin & A. Nobay eds.) (1973); W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE
UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953); Smith, High Progressive Tax
Rates: Inequity and Immorality? 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 451 (1968).
32. The "ability to pay" framework is related to a tax base defined in terms
of either income, consumption or wealth.
33. R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 17 (rev. ed. 1976).
1986] 1671
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ous that it lacks practical content.34
There is similar disagreement over the economic criteria of
stability and neutrality. On the one hand, the tax system is sup-
posed to serve stability and economic growth. This means the tax
system should be used to, for example, promote full employment,
price stability, and an increase in the gross national product
("GNP"). On the other hand, the tax system is supposed to be
neutral as to the economy. This conflict between stability and
neutrality can be seen in the debate over the accelerated deprecia-
tion deduction system ("ACRS") and the investment credit
("ITC").35 These two tax provisions were originally enacted to
encourage capital formation. The depreciation deduction has
been regularly revised to provide more benefit to the taxpayer.
Because evidence exists that these provisions distort the economy
and discriminate against certain businesses, the depreciation de-
duction has been substantially reduced and the investment credit
eliminated.36 Few authorities thoroughly analyze the economic
aspects of tax policy,37 and those that do disagree considerably
over the extent to which the tax system should be used for eco-
nomic purposes and whether the tax system should serve eco-
nomic efficiency.38
34. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 31, at 64.
35. Blum, Accelerated Depreciation: A Proper Allowance For Measuring Net In-
come?!!, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1172 (1980); Dilley & Okpechi, CLADR Depreciation: Its
Use, Benefits, and Rule in Capital Formation, 57 TAXES 401 (1979); Lischer, Reprecia-
tion Policy: Wither Thou Goest, 32 Sw. L.J. 545 (1978); Polash, A Note on the Relative
Efficiency of an Acceleration of Depreciation Allowances and an Increase in the Investment
Tax Credit, 32 NAT'L TAxJ. 97 (1979).
36. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 37-62 (modifying various portions of
sections 168, 48, 7701, 341 and 32 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984); id. at 82-86
(repealing investment tax credit); Comment, The Process Behind Successful Tax Re-
form, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1803, 1826-27 (1986).
37. Hansmann, The Current State of Law and Economics Scholarship, J. LEGAL
EDUC., 217, 221-23 (1983). In his article, Hansmann surveys areas of the law in
which law and economics scholarship has taken root as well as other areas in
which it has not. In the area of tax, the author finds very little law and econom-
ics scholarship. Id. at 221. He quickly adds that there is a plentitude of lay eco-
nomics literature which is directed toward policy issues. Id. However, he notes
that legal taxation scholars do not write in economics terms; instead, they write
in a "lawyerly" fashion. Id. at 221 n.12 (referring to Clark, The Federal Income
Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603 (1975) (clarifies tax policy
concernign financial intermediaries)). He further attempts to explain the lack of
law and economics scholarship in tax as due to the delayed effect of the recent
development of public finance reaching lawyers. Id. at 222. Hansmann con-
cludes that he expects tax will become a major area of growth for law and eco-
nomics scholarship. Id. at 223.
38. Barker & Kieschnick, Taxes and Growth, 23 TAX NOTES 629 (1984); Bitt-
ker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?
1672 [Vol. 31: p. 1665
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The second reason traditional tax policy is not normative is
that the criteria are contradictory. Because traditional tax policy
criteria represent social and economic as well as revenue raising
objectives, conflicts among the policy criteria are frequent and
unavoidable. Traditional tax policy analysis is predicated upon
shifting theoretical tenets. Thus, regardless of how facially per-
suasive a particular analysis might be, no analysis could ever be
compelling because it would be unclear whether the tenets of tax
policy which served as its foundation were not subordinate to
conflicting tenets which compelled a different result.
The tax policy literature is replete with these conflicts. For
example, administerability clashes with horizontal equity when
imputed income is not taxed. 39 Vertical equity clashes with ad-
ministerability because progressive rates cause income-shifting
and income-bunching.40 Neutrality clashes with administerability
when capital gains are not taxed like ordinary income.4 1 Horizon-
tal equity clashes with neutrality when interest and savings are
taxed.42 Vertical equity clashes with neutrality when high tax rates
16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979) (also in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (H.
Aaron & M. Boskin eds.) (1980)); see, e.g., Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corpo-
rate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (1982). Ackerman analyzes the public
policies that differentiate firms on the basis of organizational form, namely com-
petition between non-profit and profit entities. Id. at 1019 n.9. The author im-
plies that the tax related issues for non-profit entities raises questions regarding
economic efficiency, and concludes that tax on non-profit "unrelated" business
income creates more problems than it initially sought to prevent and, therefore,
should be repealed.
39. D. Laibler, Income Tax Incentives for Owner-Occupied Housing, in TAXATION
OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL (A. Harberger & M. Bailegeds, eds. 1969). For an
example of imputed income as the value of a house person's services, see
Gronau, The Intra-Family Allocation of Time: The Value of the Housewives' Time, 63
AMER. ECON. REV. 634 (1973); White, Horizontal Inequity in the Federal Income Tax
Treatment of Homeowners and Tenants, 18 NAT'L TAXJ. 225 (1965); It's Time to Get
Homeowner's Deductions Under Contrbl, 12 TAX NOTES 963 (1981).
40. Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress's 1981 Response to the "Mar-
riage Penalty" Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 468 (1983); Gann, Abandoning Marital Sta-
tus as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980); Griswold,
A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Provisions with Respect to
Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1942); Lent, Taxation of Financial
Intermediaries, 22 NAT'L TAX. J. 139 (1969).
41. Bailey, Capital Gains and Income Taxation, in TAXATION OF INCOME FROM
CAPITAL (A. Harberger & M. Bailey eds. 1966); Bossons, Economic Effects of the
Capital Gains Tax, 29 CAN. TAX. J. 809 (1981); Minarik, Full Taxation of Capital
Gains: Who Wins and Who Loses?, TAX NOTES 3 (1977); Richman, Reconsideration of
the Capital Gains Tax-A Comment, 14 NAT'L TAXJ. 402 (1961).
42. Bradford, The Economics of Tax Policy Toward Savings, in THE GOVERN-
MENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION (G. von Furstenberg ed. 1980); Becker & Ful-
lerton, Income Tax Incentives to Promote Saving, 33 NAT'L TAX J. 331 (1980);
Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649 (1983); Ture, The
Tax Bias Against Saving, 69 PROC. NAT'L TAX A. 18 (1976).
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cause taxpayers to choose leisure over labor.43 Vertical equity
clashes with horizontal equity because certain deductions neces-
sary to a policy of taxing only income in the Haig-Simons sense
are worth more to taxpayers in higher brackets than those in
lower brackets. 44
Since almost any general or specific reform measure will have
conflicting consequences it is impossible to determine the proper
reform under traditional tax policy criteria.45 Ordinarily, tenets of
policy are revised or deleted when they conflict with superior ten-
ets, which, in turn, requires the determination of a hierarchical
order to be given the criteria. This would seem to be applicable
to the criteria of federal income tax policy because there are fre-
quent and unavoidable conflicts among them. 46 But traditional
tax policy makes no pretense of establishing a normative hierar-
chical order. It does not attempt to reconcile or eliminate con-
flicting criteria, nor does it give any quantifiable weight to the
criteria. The traditional tax policy literature indicates that each of
the existing criteria should be included in tax policy.47 Conse-
quently, these traditional theorists are constrained by the theoret-
43. JOINT COMMITrEE ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1955); see generally
G. Break, Income Taxes and Incentives to Work. An Empirical Study, 47 AM. ECON.
REV. 529 (1957); C. Brown, TAXATION AND THE INCENTIVE TO WORK (1980);
Brown & Levin, The Effects of Income Taxation on Overtime. The Results of a National
Survey, 84 ECON. J. 833 (1974); Sgontz, Does the Income Tax Favor Human Capital?
35 NAT'L TAXJ. 99 (1982); Income Taxes and Incentives to Work, 61 AM. ECON. REV.
435 (1971).
44. Cloffeller, Tax-Induced Distortions and the Business-Pleasure Borderline, 91
AM. ECON. REV. 1053 (1983); Corman, The Use and Misuse of Tax Shelters: The
Congress and Tax Reform, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 509 (1974); Feld, Fairness in Rate
Cuts in the Individual Income Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 429 (1983); Halperin, Broad-
ening the Base-The Case of Fringe Benefits, 37 NAT'L TAXJ. 271 (1984); Halperin,
Capital Gains and Ordinary Deductions: Negative Income Taxes for the Wealthy, 12
B.C.L. REV. 387 (1971); Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification of
Historical Inequities, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 425 (1985).
45. For a discussion of the various attempts made at tax reform and the
diverse theoretical approaches thereto, see infra notes 54-55 and accompanying
text.
46. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to untangle the complexity of
the federal income tax system and to create methods of achieving a meaningful
and simplified system. See Gustafson, supra note 2.
47. Sneed, supra note 5, at 574. Sneed states that it is obvious that frequent
unavoidable conflicts between the criteria notes are unavoidable. Id. at 599. He
emphasizes that it is impossible to consider all criteria equally important at all
times and in all places. Id. at 601. Although he suggests that the solution is to
rank the criteria, Sneed realizes that such ranking can never remain fixed. The
subjective test Sneed employs to rank the criteria "must be done by intuition,
illuminated by intelligence and guided by integrity." Id. For Sneed's general
ranking of the criteria, see infra text accompanying note 49.
1674 [Vol. 31 : p. 1665
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ical approach to accept each and every one of the conflicting
criteria as valid criteria of tax policy. Once tax theorists have re-
duced the tax system to its theoretical tenets, there is no basis on
which to distinguish among them. In theory, each criterion is
valid.
An example of the problem with the traditional criteria is
provided by Sneed's classic article The Criteria of Federal Income Tax
Policy.48 In that article, he attempts to order the general criteria
into what he terms "macro-criteria" as follows: First echelon: ad-
ministerability (which he calls practicality) and horizontal equity
(which he calls equity); Second echelon: neutrality (which he calls
free market compatibility) and political order; Third echelon:
vertical equity (which he calls reduced economic equality); Fourth
echelon: stability and Last echelon: revenue raising (which he
calls adequacy). 49 In addition, Sneed recognizes numerous spe-
cific "micro-criteria" of tax policy. 50
After ordering the macro-criteria, Sneed proceeds with a
"demonstration," in which he applies his tax-policy ordering to
evaluate the tax law with respect to the treatment by corporations
of capital contributions by those other than shareholders. 51 Ex-
48. See generally Sneed, supra note 5, at 567. Sneed states that because
clashes among the criteria are so likely to occur, the importance of choice is
crucial. Id. at 595. He then goes on to demonstrate several examples of criteria
conflict, and offers his view as to which criterion, if any, should be subordinated
to others. Id. at 599-601.
49. Id. at 568. These seven "paramount" purposes may be implemented as
a measure for the whole income tax structure. Sneed describes the seven criteria
in great detail and demonstrates how each plays an integral role in the income
tax system. Id.
50. Id. Sneed describes micro-criteria as "less pervasive more particular-
ized ends." Id. He concludes that because macro-criteria cannot exhaust all fed-
eral income tax purposes, the micro-criteria are necessary to round out general
guidelines to the federal income tax. Id.
51. Id at 608-12. The following excerpts from Sneed's demonstration re-
veal how well the criteria "function with useful precision in evaluating the in-
come tax":
[I]n terms of Practicality the advantage [of an alternative to present tax
treatment], if any, appears marginal .... Equity is more troublesome
A fair conclusion is that Equity calls for a precise measurement
which in some instances cannot be made. This suggests that the choice
is between undertaking a task in which inaccuracy in performance fre-
quently may be the result and adopting a structure which avoids a diffi-
cult task but which also compromises the standard of Equity . . . Free
Market Compatibility also offers somewhat ambiguous guidance . . .
Adequacy ... is of course involved, [but not significantly] . . . Reduced
Economic Inequality sounds no loud and clear notes... Stability offers
little help beyond the vague observations that the sections [sections
118 and 362(c) of the 1954 Code] probably reduce some investments
... Nor is Political Order of much greater assistance... Finally, signifi-
1986] 1675
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cerpts from the demonstration reveal that the criteria do not in
fact "function with useful precision in evaluating the income
tax." 52 Sneed's language illustrates both the contradictions in-
herent in the traditional criteria, and the first point made above,
i.e., that theoretical criteria have no relevance to real world deci-
sion-making. Apparently Sneed anticipated some criticism, for he
concluded: "with this the demonstration of the application of the
macro-criteria ends. The impatient will feel their utility is inade-
quate because no clear answer was unmistakably dictated, but this
misconstrues their function. They serve only to assist the act of
human judgment, not to supplant it." 5 3 In spite of Sneed's asser-
tion, however, his macro- and micro-criteria do not serve to "as-
sist human judgment," for in the aggregate they are not
normative in the heuristic sense.
The above argument should not be taken to mean that di-
verse goals are necessarily fatal to the creation of a truly norma-
tive tax policy. Even goals which are so diverse as to be
inconsistent will not be fatal if there is a way to choose among
them, either by weighing them or arranging them in an unequivo-
cal order of predominance. But present income tax policy fails to
do this, as revealed by an examination of the tax policy literature.
In sum, the present tax policy is an ill-defined mixture of ad hoc
tax, economic, and social policies which are theoretically
incoherent.
The "new public finance" scholarship is an attempt at recon-
ciling the opposing criteria of equity and allocative efficiency.5 4
The scholarship uses economic analysis to make assumptions
which isolate limited issues for analysis.5 5 The theory behind the
scholarship is to use assumptions and narrowly define the issues
to gain insights and certainty not otherwise attainable if all eco-
nomic variables are considered. 56 However, this scholarship, like
cant applicable micro-criteria do not appear to exist ... On balance it
appears that neither the existing structure nor its [alternative] wins un-
qualified approval.
Id.
52. Id. at 608-12.
53. Id. at 613.
54. R. KuTrNER, THE ECONOMIC ILLUSION: FALSE CHOICES BETWEEN PROP-
ERTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1984); A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE BIG
TRADE OFF (1975); A. OKUN, FURTHER THOUGHTS ON EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY
IN INCOME REDISTRIBUTION (C. Campbell ed. 1977).
55. For a review of the literature, see Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform,
6J. PUB. ECON. 77 (1976).
56. W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, ch. 7 (1976);
A. M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983).
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the traditional tax scholarship, is ultimately derived from the cri-
teria of equity and efficiency and as such involves the same moral
value judgments as traditional tax policy.5 7
III. THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH
A theoretical approach which is ineffective in the develop-
ment of a normative income tax policy, and therefore is an imped-
iment to successful tax reform, must be abandoned in favor of a
workable approach. But what approach should be taken? One of
several available approaches is a pragmatic approach that adopts
as its major tenet the efficient collection of tax revenue. 58 The
approach is pragmatic because it focuses on what works from the
standpoint of administrative feasibility. Its goal is to establish a
workable tax system that yields the most revenue for the least
amount of administration costs. 59 A highly beneficial result of
concentrating on the efficient collection of revenue as a guiding
principle is that the tax system becomes susceptible of monitoring
to determine if its purpose is in fact being achieved.
60
At its inception, the primary function of the income tax was
to raise revenue.6 1 Only in the late 1930's did Congress begin to
assert that the income tax should be used to shape the economy
and to accomplish social objectives. Slowly, the pursuit of these
objectives became considered as important as raising revenue. 62
57. For a sum of the sources of this economically favored tax reform and
tax policy scholarship, see supra note 54.
58. See Bittker, Effective Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy?, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 780,
807-808 (1974); Surrey, Our Troubled Tax Policy: False Routes and Proper Paths to
Change, 12 TAx NOTES 179, 186-87 (1981).
59. For a discussion of how a pragmatic approach would develop a
"calculus of utility," see infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
60. See generally Feldstein, supra note 55, at 77.
61. Calkins, A Federal Income Tax Designed for Revenue Only, 23 TAX NOTES
201, 202 (1984). Calkins points out that since 1916 when the Revenue Act was
born out of the necessity to outfit an army and a navy, the raison d'etre of the
federal income tax system has been to raise revenue. Id. The uncertainty over
the federal tax system's capacity to continue raising revenue has only recently
become a question. Id. at 200-205.
62. Id. at 202. In the late 1930's, Congress began to think in terms of utiliz-
ing the system of federal taxation to shape the economy. Id. The first sugges-
tion of this motivation appeared in the report of the Ways and Means
Committee on the Revenue Bill of 1938. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1939-1 C.B. 728). In reporting the Revenue Bill of 1941, the
Ways and Means Committee stated:
It has been your Committee's aim and desire to distribute the addi-
tional tax burden as equitably as possible among the several classes of
taxpayers. Due consideration has also been given to the economic and
social effects of the increased levies. There was continually in mind the
1986] 1677
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As a consequence, the size and number of tax exemptions and
deductions in the Code increased. Some of the economic objec-
tives were to encourage capital formation, 63 to promote the de-
velopment and protection of our natural resources 64 and to
prevent placing United States business at a competitive disadvan-
tage to firms in other countries.6 5 Some of the social objectives
were to promote charities, 66 to encourage the purchase of resi-
dences,67 to foster the development of employee retirement
funds and health benefits 68 and to prevent hardships due to casu-
alty and medical expenses.69 In addition to these economic and
need for keeping to a minimum, consistent with our defense efforts, any
disruption of our economy, and, at the same time, supplying a needed
restraint upon inflationary tendencies.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941-2 C.B. 413). In the
following year, the Committee recommended still further increases, stating:
It is thus apparent that our revenue needs are extreme and your Com-
mittee have [sic] endeavored to secure every dollar of additional reve-
nue which, in its opinion, the national economy can bear. In its effort
toward this objective, however, care has been exercised in every in-
stance not to place an unbearable burden on any taxpayer.
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1942-2 C. B. 372-73).
63. Id. at 203. The crucial decade was the 1960's; in the early years, con-
cern had arisen that the economy was slowing down. Id. The Kennedy Adminis-
tration began what would become a trend by introducing an investment credit to
stimulate capital investment in productive facilities-use of the income tax to
mold the economy. Id. The Secretary of the Treasury stated:
This matter has top priority in the agenda for tax reform. As chief
financial officer of the Nation, I do not lightly regard tax abatements on
the scale proposed here. I urge this legislation because it will make a
real addition to growth consistent with the principles of a free econ-
omy; because it will provide substantial help in alleviating our balance-
of-payments problem, both by substantially increasing the relative at-
tractiveness of domestic as compared with foreign investment and by
helping to improve the competitive position of American industry in
markets at home and abroad; and because, far from adding to the
forces responsible for alternative recessions and recoveries, it will be of
major assistance in strengthening our present recovery and enabling us
to attain a higher rate of growth and sustained full employment. Early
action will resolve uncertainty or hesitancy and begin at once a strong
and lasting incentive for modernization of the productive facilities of
our national economy.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962-3 C.B. 707, 716).
64. Id. at 204-05.
65. Id. at 204. For example, one of the claimed goals of the Revenue Act of
1971 was that it was designed to increase our exports and improve our balance
of payments. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1972-1 C.B.
498).
66. Id. at 203. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 1986).
67. Calkins, supra note 61, at 205. It was suggested that legislation be intro-
duced to support the use of "tax-exempt financing" to facilitate home owner-
ship. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 213-14; see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 104, 213 (West Supp. 1986) (Compen-
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social objectives, preferences were enacted into the Code to ben-
efit special interests, such as farmers, 70 financial institutions, 71 the
military72 and ministers. 73
The consequence of special interest and economic and social
legislation has been to steadily narrow the tax base and to pro-
gressively disable the income tax as a principle source of federal
revenue. Using the federal income tax to guide the economy
through selective reductions in, and deferrals of, tax can contrib-
ute to serious problems of perceived unfairness, noncompliance
and complexity. It may also be counterproductive in the pursuit
of its stated objective: the improvement of the economy.7 4
The development of any tax policy must begin with the rec-
ognition of fundamental rules. Three such rules underlie the
pragmatic approach. The first is really a statement of purpose,
and thus serves as the ultimate standard in evaluating any federal
tax: The sole origin and merit of any tax system lies in its utility for raising
revenue to offset government expenditures. This has nothing whatever
to do with theory, it merely states the historical fact: taxation is a
method of financing government. Under a pragmatic approach to
tax policy the major focus of the tax system would be upon reve-
sation for injuries and sickness; medical expense deduction); id. § 165 (casualty
loss deduction).
70. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 103(b)(16)(B) (West Supp. 1986) (acquisition of land
used for farming exempt from being treated as an "obligation" for purposes of
counting interest thereon as part of gross income); I.R.C. § 116(b)(l) (West
Supp. 1986) (dividend declared by farmer's cooperative association not part of
gross income under § 116); I.R.C. § 521 (West Supp. 1986) (farmer's coopera-
tive exempt from taxation).
71. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 57(a)(7)(West Supp. 1986) (reserves for less on bad
debt of financial institutions); I.R.C. § 291 (e) (West Supp. 1986) (preference for
financial institutions vis-a-vis interest on qualified indebtedness); I.R.C. § 585
(West Supp. 1986) (preferential treatment for reserves for loss on loans of
banks).
72. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 112 (West Supp. 1986) (exclusion of combat pay from
gross income); I.R.C. § 217(g) (West Supp. 1986) (special treatment of moving
expense deduction for members of the armed forces); I.R.C. § 692 (West Supp.
1986) (special treatment in event of death of members of armed forces while
serving).
73. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 402(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1986) (preferential treat-
ment for annuity income of duly ordained ministers); I.R.C. § 1402(e) (West
Supp. 1986) (tax exemption for services performed by duly ordained ministers).
74. See Calkins, supra note 61, at 210. Tax incentives, although intended to
stimulate the development of small business under the theory that a reduced
capital gains rate will encourage investors to provide capital therefor, may be
having adverse effects. Id. Reduced rates of capital gains tax also encourages
investment in land, gold and collectibles, none being directly productive of in-
come or employment. Id. The use, therefore, of the federal income tax to guide
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nue raising. Under this approach a conclusion would be reached
as to how much revenue must be raised but not as to the proper
source of funds. The President and Congress could establish the
revenue level desirable for all direct expenditures and the tax sys-
tems would be devised to efficiently collect the revenue for the
workings of the system.
The second fundamental rule of a pragmatic tax policy is a
necessary corollary to the first rule: A tax scheme that is practical is a
necessary and co-extensive part of one that efficiently raises revenue. Practi-
cality implies three things: 1) convenience and ease of assessment
and collection; 2) structural unity and simplicity and 3) certainty
of obligation. 75 It is clear that revenues are not going to be maxi-
mized unless there is relative ease of collection. Collection is
made easier when the tax system is simple and not subject to fre-
quent change. In addition, anything that adversely affects compli-
ance limits the effective tax base.7 6 The single most significant
factor in this regard is complexity. When the complexity of the
tax system increases, the system becomes more difficult to admin-
ister, which inevitably results in increased intentional and unin-
tentional noncompliance. 77 Certainty of obligation comes with a
simple and completed tax code, one not requiring constant
change.
The third fundamental rule of a pragmatic tax policy is of an
operational nature: Taxation causes adverse social and economic effects
75. See Sneed, supra note 5 at 572-73. For another view of how simplifica-
tion of the Code will achieve these three components of practicallity, see gener-
ally Gephardt & Wessel, Tax Reform: A "But-For" Test 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 895
(1985).
76. J. HELLERSTEIN, TAXES, LOOPHOLES, AND MORALS (1963); See ABA, A
REPORT OF THE ABA SECTION OF TAXATION INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON IN-
COME TAX COMPLIANCE, (1983); AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
TAX COMPLIANCE LITERATURE (1984-85); Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Iden-
tifying and Controlling Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657 (1985); Graetz &
Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance. Fact and Fantasy, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 355
(1985); Gwartney & Long, INCOME TAX AVOIDANCE: EVIDENCE FORM INDIVIDUAL
TAX RETURNS (1985) (Workshop Paper, Dep't of Economics and Political Sci-
ence, Florida State University); Haskell, Tax Compliance and Tax Fairness, 27 TAX
NOTES 839 (1985); Henry, Noncompliance with U.S. Tax Law-Evidence on Size,
Growth, and Composition, 37 TAX LAw 1 (1983); Skinner & Slemrod, An Economic
Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 NAT'L TAXJ. 345 (1985); Spicer & Lundstedt, Under-
standing Tax Evasion 31 PUB. FIN. 295 (1976); Stiglitz, The General Theory of Tax
Avoidance, 36 NAT'L TAX. J. 325 (1985).
77. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 dealt with tax
compliance. See LeDuc, An Evaluation of Recent Taxpayers Compliance Legislation and
Future Options, 20 TAX NOTES 115 (1983); LeDuc, Improving the Self-Assessment of
Federal Income Tax: Recent Legislative Developments, 19 TAX NOTES 1027 (1983); Le-
Duc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit Lottery, and
Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTES 363 (1983).
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which operate to delimit the taxable capacity of every tax base, thus social
and economic effects which reduce the taxable capacity of a tax base should be
minimized. This rule can also be inferred from a historical study of
taxation, but essentially it is a logical conclusion supported by the
weight of authority. 78 That the dynamics of taxation cause social
and economic side effects is beyond question. Such side effects
can be "adverse" and thus can create limits to the taxable capacity
of the tax system. Under the pragmatic approach economic and
social goals would be pursued by direct means via governmental
subsidies. 79
The adverse effects of taxation operate to limit the taxable
capacity of an income tax by restricting the tax base. Income tax-
ation itself retards economic growth, which limits the available tax
base. Both the effective rate of taxation and the rate of progres-
sivity work to restrict incentives for productive activity and invest-
ment, and reduce the net after-tax return between risky and safe
investments, thereby influencing investment decisions.80 Fur-
thermore, any of the adverse effects of taxation may make it polit-
ically or economically necessary to redefine the tax base more
narrowly, which again limits the available tax base. One of the
most significant factors having this latter effect is the perception
78. See Gustafson, supra note 2, at 3-4; see generally Smith, supra note 8.
79. See generally Federal Taxation, supra note 5. Although traditional tax pol-
icy theorists characterization of general and specific criteria of tax policy empha-
size their positive aspects, in every case their possible aspects are indirectly
derived from negative effects that flow directly from the taxation. Perhaps the
most obvious case is the criterion of neutrality. Almost all tax theorists would
admit that taxation, by its very nature, will slow economic growth, yet the goal of
neutrality is simply to affect the economy as little as possible.
The nature of the other criteria is negative as well. For example, each of the
specific criteria goals representing ad hoc economic policies can be imple-
mented through favored tax treatment of particular economic activities, but only
because continuing repressive economic effects make alternative economic activ-
ities unattractive. It is the same with the implementation of social policies, as,
for example, the general criteria of vertical equity and the specific criteria of
charitable giving. Vertical equity may be desirable, but it can only be achieved
through taxation by disproportionately reducing the economic resources of
higher income groups. And charitable giving, a highly regarded goal, is stimu-
lated through the tax system only because it can be made to serve as a tax-avoid-
ance mechanism. Thus, regardless of what beneficial social and economic
purposes can be promoted through manipulation of tax, their effects on taxation
operate to limit its capacity to raise revenue. Consequently, a tax system should
be adopted that has as its primary function the raising of revenue, not the pro-
motion of economic or social goals.
80. Under a graduated tax, the rate of a tax preference equals the tax-
payer's marginal tax rate, with wealthy taxpayers receiving a larger benefit for a
given deduction than poor taxpayers. See Surrey, Tax Incentives As a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
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of unfairness, which stimulates ameliorating tax expenditures."'
The enactment of special economic and social incentives has the
same effect.
The taxable unit can also operate to limit the taxable capacity
of the income tax. For example, the elimination of the corporate
tax would substantially reduce tax revenues. Under a progressive
income tax system where a standard deduction is allowed, the ag-
gregation of income of a family into one taxable unit would raise
tax revenues. On the other hand, when smaller taxable units in
such a system are allowed, such as trusts and dependent children,
less revenue would be collected.
Tax rates can operate to limit the taxable capacity of the in-
come tax. This occurs when the effects of the tax increase cause a
decrease in the effective tax base (through a decrease in compli-
ance and/or the actual tax base) that more than offsets the effect
of the rate hike. The absolute limit of taxable capacity is that
point at which an increase in tax rates would result in a decrease
in total revenue. In practice, however, the absolute limit could
probably never be reached. Instead, there are lower political lim-
its to taxable capacity where the adverse political and economic
effects of a tax increase would more than offset the benefit de-
rived from the additional revenue.8 2 While the political limits of
taxation may manifest themselves differently,83 they nevertheless
are a function of the same dynamics of income taxation which
81. "Tax expenditures" represent taxes being "spent" (through being lost
to the tax system) to achieve specific nontax goals. See Tax Policy and Tax Reform:
1961-1969, 170-71 (F. Hallmuth and 0. Oldman, eds. 1973) (compilation of
selected speeches and testimony of Stanley Surrey) [hereinafter cited as Tax Pol-
icy and Reform]; see Gustafson, supra note 2; Smith, supra note 8, at 9. Some coun-
tries have continued their dynamic economic growth despite high taxation. Id.
at 8. Others have either stagnated or never really shared in the world's ex-
panding productivity. Id. Apparently, the secret of economic vitality is not solely
dependent on the tax system. Id. The combination of economic, social and
political forces determine whether "the environment will foster such en-
trepreneurial talent as may exist in a country." Id. at 8-9.
In the area of investment, taxation modifies the rewards. Id. Smith explains
that "[h]igh income taxation by reducing the net differential between risky and
safe investment, tends to drive funds from the former [risky] to the latter [safe]."
Id. He adds that a "favorable treatment of gains" could pull in the opposite
direction. Id.
82. See Gustfason, supra note 2, at 3-4. For a discussion of the structure of
the tax system related to its social purposes see supra notes 5-6 and accompany-
ing text.
83. Such political limits operate in two ways: first, by influencing the fiscal
policy decisions regarding total expenditures and the revenue-debt mix of fi-
nancing expenditure to create, in effect, a maximum allowable revenue target;
and second, by influencing how the tax burden can be distributed.
1682 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1665
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limit the system's absolute capacity. Thus, either through repres-
sive economic effects that shrink the "economic pie" and directly
erode the tax base, or through various effects that indirectly
erode the tax base,8 4 the side effects of income taxation ultimately
operate to delimit its capacity to raise revenue. Thus, regardless
of what beneficial social and economic purposes can be promoted
through manipulation of tax rates,8 5 their effects on taxation op-
erate to limit its capacity to raise revenue.
It is time that the federal income tax be viewed as a means to
raise revenue. That is the way that property and sales taxes are
viewed in this country. 86 It is desirable that taxes raise the reve-
nue that is needed, not shape the economy. If one begins to ap-
proach the federal income tax from a similar perspective, we will
find that it can be made into a fair, reasonably progressive, effec-
tive producer of the revenue which the federal government re-
quires. Furthermore, once we have determined that we will not
modify the tax to stimulate any particular segment of the econ-
omy, we will find that we need to change the law less often. Once
we set revenue as our objective, we will find that simplicity is
much easier to achieve. No longer will we have to design long
provisions to assure that benefits go to the intended targets. 87 As
we turn to a practical tax base, rationality will return to the Code
and the frequency with which citizens will encounter unexpected
results will diminish. Persons similarly situated will more often
have similar tax burdens. Those with more income and wealth
will, in general, pay more tax in proportion to their income than
those with lesser income or wealth. Perceptions that the tax sys-
tem is fair will increase. It may even be that the willingness of
citizens to self-assess and pay their obligation will again begin to
grow.
84. See Smith, supra note 8, at 6-10. Smith points out two possible effects of
high taxation: the limitation of incentives leading to a curtailment of production
and the potential to restrict private spending to offset government spending. Id.
at 6.
85. See generally id. at 11-14. Smith recognizes that economists must con-
sider not only "what might be theoretically possible if people would behave as
we might wish them to (and as we think they should)," but also political behavior
actualities. Id. at 11.
86. See generally J. Duc &J. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION ch. 1 (1983); A. LYNN,
PROPERTY-TAx DEVELOPMENTS: SELECTED HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES IN PROP-
ERTY TAXATION USA (R. Lindholm ed. 1967).
87. In a general sense, the impetus of this article is to demonstrate the
soundness of this proposition. For a discussion of a similar proposition, i.e. that
numerous selective reductions in and deferrals of tax contribute to serious
problems of complexity, see Calkins, supra note 61, at 210.
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IV. WHY A PRAGMATIC APPROACH Is NECESSARY
The major criticisms of the present income tax system follow
traditional policy grounds. These are: 1) it is unfair; 2) it it too
complicated and 3) it unnecessarily retards economic growth. A
pragmatic tax system would help to alleviate all these problems.
Perhaps the single most common complaint about the tax
system is that it is "unfair." Thus, the major criticism of a prag-
matic approach to tax policy will likely be that it does not take into
account "fairness," or horizontal and vertical equity. The con-
cept of fairness has always played a central role in tax policy, be-
cause of the perception that unfairness causes dissatisfaction
among taxpayers. This adversely affects the tax system both di-
rectly through reduced compliance and increased administrative
costs, and indirectly through increased political intervention
which frequently leads to legislation resulting in a smaller tax
base and increased complexity. Nevertheless, "fairness" cannot
be a criterion of normative tax policy. Even though there may be
widespread concurrence about the abstract nature of fairness,
there is no such agreement over its "applied" meaning. Although
most traditional tax theorists equate horizontal equity with the
Haig-Simons definition of income, this would serve to define the
concept functionally by relating it to how comprehensive the in-
come tax should be to be "fair." Assuming the Haig-Simons defi-
nition could be meaningfully applied, does not this treatment
only beg the issue, for what would be a "fair" application of the
Haig-Simons definition? The unavoidable conclusion is that
"horizontal equity," or "fairness," is impossible to define to a de-
gree where it could function with useful precision in evaluating an
income tax. 8 Hence, "fairness" is, and would always be, a com-
plicating, and thus counterproductive, criterion of income tax
policy.
Second, a chronic, if not the most acute, problem of the in-
come tax system is its complexity.8 9 Complexity causes a variety
88. See Sneed, supra note 5, at 579-80.
89. Structural complexity in the Code (deviations from the comprehensive
income base different taxable units, etc) leads to transactional complexity as tax-
payers plan to avail themselves of the tax preferences created in the tax struc-
ture. Transactional responses are then met with structural changes, which, in
turn, are met with new tax planning techniques. Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic:
A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics and Tax Reform, COLUM. L. REV. 1553 (1980);
Galper & Kaufman, Simplification and Comprehensive Tax Reform, in OFFICE OF TAX
ANALYSIS PAPERS No. 34 (1978) (U.S. Treasury Department). An example of this
is the time value of money rules enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 as a
response to tax planning transactions entered into to take advantage of tax
[Vol. 3 1: p. 16651684
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 6 [1986], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss6/3
A PRAGMATIC ALTERNATIVE
of adverse effects, all of which operate to reduce the efficiency of
the tax system. At a recent conference on this issue it was con-
cluded that "the burdens of income tax complexity on taxpayers
and government alike constitute a danger to the health of the in-
come tax system and to this nation's continued reliance on self-
assessment and voluntary compliance." 90 Thus, one objective of
tax policy has to be to simplify the Code. Unfortunately, since
complexity is inherent in every statutory scheme, there are limits
to simplification. Nevertheless, a pragmatic approach to tax pol-
icy can achieve significant simplification by reducing the complex-
ity in the Code that has been introduced as a product of
theoretical tax policy.
There are basically two categories of tax code provisions,
"structural" provisions and "special" provisions. Structural pro-
visions are those which are necessary to implement a tax on in-
come. Special provisions are those that define "taxable income"
on bases other than revenue considerations, specifically, social or
special economic considerations. Complexity from structural
provisions is unavoidable but complexity from special provisions
is not, thus a pragmatic tax policy would eliminate special provi-
sions altogether. One analyst summed up the complexity-simpli-
fication issue as follows: "The best way to have simple tax laws is
to have a simple tax policy. Each added policy requirement usu-
ally adds complexity." 9' As an example, think of the ironic rela-
tionship between "complexity" and "fairness." The complexity
of the tax system frequently manifests itself in the form of com-
plaints about unfairness, and yet attempts to make the system
more fair inevitably make the system more complex.
Third, a pragmatic approach to tax policy would work to re-
duce the repressive (macro) economic effects of income taxation.
As a start, simplifying the tax system by eliminating special social
and economic provisions would redound to the benefit of the
economy through reduced public and private costs to administer
the system.92 More important, however, the repressive effects of
taxation would be systematically reduced through the operation
deferral. See Cunningham, A Theoretical Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Future Costs,
40 TAx. L. REV. 571 (1985); Halperin, The Time Value of Money-1984, 23 TAx
NOTEs 751 (1984); Sunleg, Observations on the Appropriate Tax Treatment of Future
Costs, 22 TAx NOTES 719 (1984).
90. Gustafson, supra note 2, at 85.
91. Id. at 28 (quoting Ward Hussey, Legislative Counsel in the Office of the
Legislative Counsel of the United States House of Representatives).
92. See Lindholm, A New Federal Tax System, 24 TAx NOTES 80, 104 (1984).
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of a "calculus of utility," 93 for presumably the calculus would be
designed to measure whether revenue is being raised efficiently.
More important, from a political perspective, in the past, the
tax system has served both to raise revenue and to spend it
through tax expenditures, and it has done neither well. However,
because of the alarming size of government expenditures in rela-
tion to GNP, it has become increasingly important that revenues
be raised and spent as efficiently as possible. That will only be
accomplished when the tax system is reformed to tax without sub-
stantial costs and social and economic policy is left to the appro-
priations and spending processes. What makes it politically
feasible to expunge social and economic policies from tax policy
is that fiscal fair treatment of taxpayers is not solely a function of
taxation. It is a function of both taxation and spending. And
there is growing academic and political awareness that tax incen-
tives are generally inferior to direct subsidies as a means of
achieving social goals. 94 Thus, tax reform is only one part of a
larger picture, and social policies that are incompatible with effi-
cient taxation can be effected by other means.
Subsidization outside the tax system is the best way to accom-
plish these social and economic policies. Congress would then be
free to optimize subsidization in two ways that are impossible
when subsidization is done through tax preferences. First, Con-
gress could give a larger subsidy to poor rather than wealthy per-
sons, thus making subsidization progressive. Such progressive
subsidization would further the goals of a progressive tax system
rather than working against them. Second, Congress would be
able to subsidize some activities more heavily than others. The
social value of some subsidized activities is undoubtedly greater
than that of others. Congress should be free to more heavily sub-
sidize those activities rather than being forced to subsidize all ac-
tivities at the same rate through the tax system.
After identifying fundamental rules and determining the
need for a change, the next step in developing a well-articulated
coherent federal tax policy is to determine what tax system or tax
systems should be adopted, and what the general characteristics
of that tax system should be. Fundamental characteristics will be
93. For a discussion of the "calculus of utility", see infra text accompanying
notes 145-53.
94. See, e.g., Gephardt & Wessel, supra note 75, at 908 ("Direct subsidies are
a more efficient method of providing relief to those sectors of the economy that
public policymakers decide are in need of help."); Calkins, supra note 61 at 211-
14 (only purpose of tax should be to raise revenue).
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addressed: 1) the tax base; 2) the rate structure and 3) the tax
unit.
A. The Tax Base
Under the pragmatic approach, the income tax system would
be retained. Traditional tax policy theorists have debated the is-
sue of whether consumption or income is the better tax. Many
have argued that a consumption tax better measures a taxpayer's
ability-to-pay,95 because tax-paying capacity is measured over a
lifetime perspective as the taxpayer consumes his income and
wealth. 96 A consumption tax taxes a taxpayer according to the
amount which he takes out of the common pool rather than ac-
cording to the amount he contributes to it.97 Consequently,
many have argued that consumption is the proper base of taxa-
tion since personal consumption is at the expense of government
expenditures. 98 Others have argued that a wealth tax added to an
income tax is the best tax system because income alone is not an
adequate test of ability to pay; nor can that capacity be assessed
by a tax based on property alone. 99
The federal tax that presently raises the most revenue is the
income tax. The modem income tax went into effect in 1913 as
part of a tariff reform act.' 00 It was intended to counterbalance
the loss of revenue involved in a reduction of the tariff, which, at
the time, was the government's chief source of revenue. The im-
portance of the income tax obviously has grown to where it is now
an indispensable source of revenue, and it is safe to conclude that
it will never be repealed unless it is proven that it no longer ful-
95. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren,
88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975); Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash-Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Bradford, The Possibilities for an Expen-
diture Tax, 35 NAT'L TAxJ. 243 (1982); Gunn, The Cash for an Income Tax, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 370 (1979).
96. H. AARON & H. GALPER, ASSESSING TAX REFORM (1985). Aaron and
Galper argue that taxation of consumption in any given year is a better measure
of lifetime ability-to-pay than is taxation of income in any given year.
97. N. KALDOR, supra note 16, at 53.
98. Andrews, supra note 95, at 1121.
99. N. KALDOR, INDIAN TAX REFORM: REPORT OF A SURVEY (1956); C. SAN-
FORD, J. WILLIS & D. IRONSIDE, AN ANNUAL WEALTH TAX (1975); Cooper, Taking
Wealth Taxation Seriously, 34 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 24 (1979); Davies, Income-Plus-
Wealth: In Search of a Better Tax Base, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 849 (1984); Dodge, The
Taxation of Wealth and Wealth Transfers: Where Do We Go After ERTA? 34 RUTGERS
L. REV. 738 (1982); Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and
Bequests on Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978).
100. For a comprehensive history of the federal income tax system, see R.
PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954).
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fills that purpose.' 0 ' Moreover, if the income tax is ever proven
unsatisfactory for raising revenue, it is safe to assume that it will
not be perpetuated to serve other purposes. Under a pragmatic
approach to tax policy, the income tax would be maintained but
improved so that its major focus is that of raising revenue.
The pragmatic approach to defining income for tax policy
purposes would not be to search for an intellectual definition like
the Haig-Simons definition that traditional tax theorists use,102
but rather to create a tax-oriented functional definition. If the
purpose of taxation is to raise revenue, the tax base must be as
broad as possible. And to achieve that objective, tax strategists
should analyze the economy to determine which elements would
be practical to tax and then design a statutory scheme accord-
ingly. The development of a definition of "taxable income"
would be wholly utilitarian and would involve only the determina-
tion of what would "work."
Thus, under the pragmatic approach, those business deduc-
tions necessary to define income 03 would remain in place. All
personal deductions, on the other hand, would be eliminated,
since equity would no longer be the guiding principle. No need
would exist for the medical expense deduction, the charitable de-
duction, the mortgage interest deduction, the state and local tax
deductions or other itemized deductions. Direct subsidization in-
stead of the tax code, would be used to accomplish social and
economic objectives. 0 4 Under a pragmatic approach, a form of
standard deduction would remain. Since the United States gov-
ernment has long had a policy of making transfer payments to
those having low incomes, it would be administratively inefficient
to tax those with low incomes only to return that income to them
in the form of welfare transfer payments. 0 5 Under the pragmatic
101. The combined individual and corporate income taxes accounted for
45% of the total tax revenue in 1982. TREASURY DEP'T, 1 TAX REFORM FOR FAIR-
NESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT (1984) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY I].
102. For a discussion of the Haig-Simons definition of income, see Turnier,
Personal Deductions and Tax Reform: The High Road and the Low Road, 31 VILL. L.
REV. 1703 (1986).
103. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 165, 167, 212 (West Supp. 1986).
104. There may be a constitutional problem, however, with direct subsidi-
zation of charities, in light of the first amendment mandate that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
105. For an argument that the personal exemption should equal the mini-
mum wage, see O'Kelley, Tax Policy for Post-Liberal Society: A Flat-Tax-Inspired Re-
definition of the Purpose and Ideal Structure of a Progressive Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 727, 744-51 (1985).
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approach, however, the amount of exempt income would be de-
termined empirically. Tax theorists could concentrate on practi-
cal questions of tax policy rather than on esoteric issues that have
no real-world relevance. Tax policy decisions would be less sub-
ject to attack, because practical considerations are relatively
unambiguous.
B. The Rate Structure
Analysis of the second major variable of an income tax sys-
tem, the rate structure, further illustrates the superiority of a
pragmatic approach to tax policy. There are two issues involved
in creating an income tax rate structure; whether to make it pro-
portional or progressive, and, if the rate structure is to be pro-
gressive, how progressive to make it.
The American income tax has always been progressive, yet
the theoretical debate over the proportional-versus-progressive
issue is nearly 300 years old and there is still no compelling theo-
retical argument for progressive taxation.' 0 6 In traditional tax
policy theory, progressivity is justified in terms of the decline in
the marginal utility of money or goods that money can acquire. '0 7
But the doctrine of marginal utility ignores the possibility that dif-
ferent taxpayers have different capacities for enjoyment and sacri-
fice. 10 8 Such differences, however, introduce subjective inquiries
not susceptible to precise measurement into the doctrine. One of
the most comprehensive modern analyses of this issue was under-
taken by Professors Blum and Kalven, who concluded:
The case for progression, after a long critical look, thus
turns out to be stubborn but uneasy. The most distinc-
tive and technical arguments advanced in its behalf are
the weakest . . . . The case has stronger appeal when
progressive taxation is viewed as a means of reducing
economic inequalities. But the case for more economic
equality, when examined directly, is itself perplexing.'0 9
106. See generally BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 31 (Recognizing that although
progressive taxation is proper, its justification rests on tenuous theoretical
grounds).
107. A. COHEN-STUART, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF THE PROGRES-
SIVE INCOME TAx, (1889); J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk 2, ch.
1, bk 5, ch. 2 (1848); A. PIGOU, A STUDY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 249; T. Carver, The
Ethical Bases of Distribution and Its Application to Taxation, 6 ANNALS 29 (uly, 1895);
F. Edgeworth, The Pure Theory of Taxation, 7 ECON. J. 550 (1897).
108. Gunn, The Case For an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370, 384 (1979).
109. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 31, at 519-20.
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Perhaps a more revealing comment on the role of the theo-
retical approach to tax policy in this area, however, was made by
another analyst who observed simply: "[I]n the historical pattern
of [progressive taxation] ... some of the most rigorous analysis of
the principle came after it had become a political reality.""l 0
What this suggests is, and it is certainly true of the Anglo-Ameri-
can experience, that progressive income taxation is not a manifes-
tation of theoretical tax policy at all, but rather the converse.",
Hence, even with the benefit of hindsight, theoretical tax policy
has been unable to make a convincing case for progressivity.
Pragmatic tax policy, on the other hand, explains, and
thereby justifies, the progressive income tax, for progressive taxa-
tion historically has been instituted for purely pragmatic reasons.
The purpose of taxation is to raise revenue, and a progressive
rate structure can raise more revenue from a given tax base than a
proportional rate structure can. This "revenue" explanation is,
of course, merely another form of the "ability-to-pay" argument.
The effective rate of taxation in a progressive system can be in-
creased by increasing the rate of progressivity without affecting
lower income groups which would otherwise have to be included
in the tax base if a proportional rate were employed to produce
the same amount of revenue. But, in either form, the argument is
a pragmatic argument, not a theoretical argument in the classic
sense."i 2 However, because the purpose of taxation is to raise
revenue, there is no question but that an efficient income tax sys-
tem should employ a progressive rate structure. Tax policy
should eliminate pretense and justify progressivity as the practical
way to raise revenue.
Once it has been decided that the income tax should be pro-
gressive, the next issue is how progressive should it be, or in
other words, what should the rates be? Progressivity is not an
unqualified virtue. Here, again theoretical tax policy provides no
help. It is evident that the principal theoretical justification for
progressivity, vertical equity, which theoretically militates for a se-
verely progressive rate structure, clashes with another goal, neu-
trality, which economists agree had a negative impact on the
degree of progressivity. '13 Because there is no theoretical basis
110. R. PAUL, supra note 100.
111. Id. at 719-27.
112. See Federal Taxation, supra note 5, at 9.
113. For a discussion of the issue in terms of the "new public finance"
scholarship, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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on which to reconcile the two, the degree of progressivity must be
determined in some other manner. The record on this issue sug-
gests that in the past the degree of progressivity has been set
more or less arbitrarily depending on the need for revenue. 14 At
the least, the variation between the high rates of progressivity in
the past and the relatively low rates of progressivity enacted by
the 1981 and 1986 Tax Reform Acts 1 5 indicates that theoretical
tax policy in this area has been inconsistent. By comparison,
pragmatic tax policy provides coherent guidance with respect to
progressivity. Pragmatically, the question to be answered is: how
should the tax burden be distributed to maximize the income
tax's ability to raise revenue from the available tax base? Obvi-
ously, this is not an easy question to answer. For one thing, the
answer will change according to how much revenue must be
raised and thus what the effective tax rate must be. Nevertheless,
the normative policy implications are apparent. The degree of
progressivity in an income tax structure should be adjusted ac-
cording to revenue needs and an economic calculus, not social
theory. 116
While such broad guidelines will not mechanically yield a de-
finitive rate structure, a pragmatic approach would at least facili-
tate the search for one. First, it would eliminate complicating
social policy considerations such as horizontal and vertical equity,
for neither offers any useful guidance on the proper degree of
progressivity. 17 Second, establishing the tax structure as a prod-
uct of an economic calculus rather than politics would tend to di-
vert the public's attention from taxation. Economics is a neutral
discipline, in intent if not in effect, so taxpayers burdened by a tax
structure prescribed by an economic calculus would be less likely
to feel unfairly discriminated against. Moreover, their attention
would probably be turned toward the expenditure side of the
budget, where arguments about fiscal and social policy belong.
Not only would this create a favorable climate for the develop-
114. See R. PAUL, supra note 100.
115. The Tax Reform Act of 1981 reduced the highest rate from 70% to
50%. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 176-82
(1981) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 1982). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced
the highest rate from 50% to 38.5%. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 101, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 14-15.
116. Prevailing economic theory suggests that the higher the effective tax
rate, the less progressive the income tax should be to maximize economic effi-
ciency and total revenue. See STUDIES IN TAXATION, PUBLIC FINANCE AND RE-
LATED SUBJECTS A COMPENDIUM 9 (1983).
117. See generally BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 31.
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ment of an efficient income tax, but it might also contribute to
greater fiscal responsibility by shedding more light on the overall
fiscal picture.
C. The Taxable Unit
Analysis of the third major variable of an income tax system,
the taxable unit, raises the issue of whether the individual, the
couple or the family should be the taxable unit and whether a tax
on trusts and corporations should be retained. Under present in-
come tax laws, the taxable unit encompasses not only the individ-
ual, married couple and head-of-household, but such legal
entities as corporations, trusts and estates. By recognizing these
legal intermediaries while at the same time acknowledging that
only people pay taxes,' 18 traditional tax policy theory creates un-
certainty as to whether the proper taxpayer is being taxed.' 19
The uncertainty present in the taxation of the family is
whether the taxable unit should be the individual, the married
couple or family.' 20 Under the traditional approach, it is unclear
whether marital status alone should be determinative or whether
certain economic circumstances, such as the extent and effect of
pooling of income, economies of scale, dual consumption, and
imputed income and imputed cost of single earner as opposed to
two-earner couples, should be taken into account. 12 1 One scholar
concluded that: "Lacking a better alternative, the federal tax sys-
tem uses marriage as a proxy to define economic units that derive
benefits from pooling financial resources to an extent that the tax
118. Royal Commission on Taxation (1966) (Carter Comm'n).
119. Traditional tax literature extensively researched the question of who
bears the incidence of the corporate tax but the answer goes unresolved. As
Joseph Pechman concludes: "There is no more controversial issue in taxation
than the question, who bears the corporation income tax? On this question,
economists ... differ among themselves." This uncertainty taints the traditional
tax theorists' analysis of the impact of corporate tax on investment decisions,
resource allocation, debt financing and other issues. Federal tax jurisprudence
has, by and large, confined its responses to tinkering at the margins: assignment
of income, "S" corporations, rules of family partnership, clear reflection of in-
come doctrines, throwback provisions, grantor trust rules and the like. By rec-
ognizing these entities, tax policy theories debase the ability-to-pay concept. See
R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 17 (Rev. ed. 1976); W. VICKREY,
AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 278 (1947).
120. See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1391 (1975).
121. Traditional tax literature is full of analyses that taxpaying capacity is
best measured by consolidated marital and family income. See Coven, The Decline
and Fall of Taxable Income, 79 U. MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1551 (1981).
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system cannot ignore." 22
Under the pragmatic approach, the taxable unit would be the
family, and dependents would be taxed at their parents' tax
rates.' 2 3 In addition, the trust as a separate legal intermediary
would be eliminated. 24 Certainly, with a progressive tax system,
more revenue can be generated by aggregating income into
larger taxable units, such as the family. The incentive to engage
in tax splitting devices could be curbed, thereby resulting in more
efficient collection of revenue. Lastly, all these changes could be
made without great practical difficulties. 125
The pragmatic approach would retain the corporation as a
separate entity. It is simply not practical to collect tax on corpo-
rate income from the thousands or millions of persons who are
shareholders. In addition, imposing tax liabilities from adjust-
ments arising from audits of a business entity cannot be feasibly
collected by assessments years later against a multitude of tax-
payer shareholders. 126 Further, eliminating the corporate income
tax would result in substantial loss of revenues because a large
percentage of corporate shares are owned by pension trusts,
other tax exempt entities and foreign investors that do not pay
tax. As with the individual income tax, the corporate tax base
would be broadened and the rates would be progressive.
D. The Gift and Estate Tax
The object of any taxing system is to fully utilize its taxing
capacity. The income tax system does not fully utilize this capac-
ity, however, because it is not practical to tax all accretion. 127 The
122. McMahon, Expanding the Taxable Unit: The Aggregation of the Income of
Children and Parents, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (1981); Thorson, An Analysis of the
Sources of Continued Controversy Over the Tax Treatment of Family Income, 18 NAT'L
TAx.J. 113 (1965).
123. See the "kiddie tax" in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 1411, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(100 Stat.) 630-32 (where portion of unearned income of child under age of
fourteen is taxed at parent's marginal tax rate) (To be codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 1(i)).
124. For a discussion of trust reform proposals along this line, see gener-
ally TREASURY I, supra note 101.
125. Accord Thorson, supra note 122, at 925. Choosing the individual as the
taxable unit would require separate accounting of the income of married
couples. This has been considered such an administrative burden as to render
impractical the use of the individual as the taxable unit.
126. S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION ch. 6 (1972).
127. See Carpenter, Net Gift Given Rise to Taxable Income to Donor. Diedrich v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 24 B.C.L. REV. 1429, 1431 nn.121-24
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principal form of accretion that is not subject to income tax is the
net accretion in the form of gifts and bequests. Consequently,
there is a place in the federal taxing system for an estate and gift
tax. The early gift and estate tax laws were intended to raise reve-
nue.' 28 Later these purposes were replaced by equitable pur-
poses-chiefly, to level accumulations of wealth. Under the
pragmatic approach, the revenue purpose of the estate and gift
tax would again become primary. Although the full taxing capac-
ity of the state could be attained through a wealth tax on non-
income earning assets such as paintings, cash balances, artwork,
antiques or jewelry, such a tax would not be practical. 129 While
this type of wealth is more visible than capital income, it is not a
feasible tax simply because of the valuation issues and the fact
that there has never been such a national wealth tax.130
While it is true that over the years the estate and gift tax has
not provided much revenue in relation to income taxes, the ques-
tion should be not whether the estate and gift tax will provide
much more or little more revenue when compared with other
taxes, but whether gifts and estates constitute a source of revenue
which is available to be tapped.' 3 '
Under a pragmatic approach, the present estate and gift tax
would be modified. First, as with the income tax system, the base
would be broadened. The estate should include property "sub-
stantially owned," even though not actually owned, by the dece-
dent.' 3 2 It should include all contractual or statutory survivor
(1983); see, e.g., I.R.C. § 102(a) (West Supp. 1986) (providing that value of prop-
erty acquired by gift not included in gross income).
128. See Gibbs, Basic Federal Estate and Gift Tax, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 809, 811
(1986) (citing C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER &J. McCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr
TAXES § 2.1, at 7 (3d ed. 1974)).
129. Such a tax could even be imposed on imputed income.
130. SeeJ. CHOMMIC, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 2 (1973) (giving a sum-
mary history of taxation in the United States).
131. See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 128, at 811. Gibbs remarks that the gift tax
laws were never intended to produce revenue from those who economically fall
within the lower to middle classes. Id. Even so, in inflationary periods, the reve-
nue producing potential of the estate tax swells as the size of the middle class
estate comes within much of the federal tax. Id. (citing Friedman, The Law of
Succession in Social Perspectives, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 21 (E.
Halbach ed. 1977)). He further notes that the federal estate tax yielded $4.6
billion in 1975, equivalent to 1.7% of total federal tax receipts. Id. (citing Tet-
scher, The Aims of Death Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 4.1 (E.
Halbach ed. 1977)).
132. Generally, the courts have rejected the Service's relatively rare at-
tempts to impose an estate tax under § 2033 where the decedent's rights in
property are less than actual ownership. See Helvering v. Safe Deposit Trust
Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1940); Estate of Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1041 (Ct.CI.
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benefits economically attributable to the decedent. 33 Such bene-
fits that accrue to the surviving family member should be included
as well as benefits receivable by the executor. Examples are So-
cial Security death benefits and copyright renewal or termination
rights. The taxable estate should also include the lapse of the so-
called "five and five" powers. 134 Life insurance, even if there are
no incidents of ownership held by the decedent, should also be
part of the taxable estate as long as the decedent made the pre-
mium payment. 135 Lastly, the gift tax should be "grossed up"
and included in the taxable estate of the decedent when the dece-
dent made gifts during his life that resulted in a gift tax. 136
Second, the estate and gift tax system should be revised to
limit the gift tax exclusions and the unified credit. The present
per-donee gift tax exclusion has led to complex rules and to wide-
spread tax avoidance, particularly in the use of so-called Crummey
trusts.' 37 Moreover, the current level of the per-donee exclusion
permits large-scale escape from transfer tax for a donor with
many descendants or other donees. The tax system under the
pragmatic approach would limit the amount of the tax exclusion
to a certain amount per donor. Similarly, under the pragmatic
approach, the unified credit would be limited. Under present law,
with proper estate tax planning, a married couple can die with
$1.2 million and pay no estate tax.' 38 This would be reduced
under the pragmatic system so that more decedents' estates pay
1976); Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1971); Kramer
v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct.CI. 1969); Estate of Wadewitz v. Commis-
sioner, 39 T.C. 925 (1963), aff'd on other grounds, 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964);
Hinze v. United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 12, 842 (C.D. Calif. 1972); Estate of
Royce v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 1090 (1942); Estate of Sessoms v. Commis-
sioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 1056 (1949). This change would merely coordinate the
income tax provisions with the estate tax provisions. See Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940); I.R.C. § 61 (West Supp. 1986).
133. This would overrule previous decisions of the federal courts in Estate
of Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Estate of Fusz v. Com-
missioner, 46 T.C. 214 (1966). These rules would apply to community property,
awards on divorce or separation, and rights created by the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984.
134. I.R.C. §§ 2041, 2514 (West Supp. 1986).
135. Under the Code, the gross estate includes only those amounts "with
respect to which the decedent possesses at his death any incidents of ownership,
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person." I.R.C. § 2042(West Supp. 1986).
136. A similar rule appears in I.R.C. section 7035 with respect to gift trans-
fers made within three years of death. See I.R.C. § 7035 (West Supp. 1986).
137. See Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
138. I.R.C. § 2010 (West Supp. 1986) (unified credit against estate tax); id.
§ 2505 (unified credit against gift tax).
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taxes. In addition to changes in the amounts exempt from estate
and gift tax, the estates would become more progressive under a
pragmatic approach. These changes would aim, as with the in-
come tax, not at levelling of wealth, but the collection of more
revenue. The smaller the exemptions and the higher the rates,
the more revenue is collected. As in the income tax area, the
questions are how much should be exempt and how progressive
should the rates be as determined by a calculus of utility.
V. THE CALCULUS OF UTILITY
A useful tax policy must be refined to the point where it can
guide decisionmaking on an operational level. On that level the
tax system is not some monolithic manifestation of broad princi-
ples. Rather, it is a multitude of individual provisions that in the
aggregate determine how comprehensive or burdensome the in-
come tax will be. This is the greatest failure of the theoretical
approach and where lies the greatest need for a pragmatic
approach.
Traditional tax policy literature uses certain assumptions
about the behavior of individuals and the economy under an "eq-
uitable" and "efficient" tax system. In general, equity-oriented
theorists usually assume that the taxpayer continue to behave the
way they would without the change in the system, or that the
change in economic conduct does not significantly alter the pre-
tax yield produced by the change. Efficiency-oriented theorists,
on the other hand, presume the taxpayer will act to save taxes by
taking advantage of the change in the system.'3 9 The problem
with traditional tax policy theory is that it does not use empirical
data to determine the actual effect of the change on the taxpayer
and the economy. As Boris Bittker observed:
It is hard to see how the normative standards favored by
either equity or efficiency theories can be applied with
confidence to existing law while the behavioral conse-
quences of most tax allowances remain terra incognita.
Only when they are mapped will we be able to say with
assurance whether particular tax allowances generate in-
equities, misallocations, or some of each. Until then, in-
tuition and political preferences must be the basis for
analysis because scholars, alas, can legitimately claim lit-
139. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive
Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 738-39 (1979).
1696 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1665
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 6 [1986], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss6/3
A PRAGMATIC ALTERNATIVE
tle more authority than the average citizen. 140
The unstated premise of all tax policy is that a tax system can
be intelligently designed, implemented, and administered, but
this requires goals and means of measuring whether the goals
have been met. 14 1 Otherwise, there can be no nexus between tax
policy and applied taxation. This is one reason a theoretical tax
policy is ineffective; there is simply no way to measure the per-
formance of the tax system in terms of theoretical goals. Just how
well the performance of the tax system can be measured is clearly
open to debate, but unquestionably, the performance of the tax
system can be empirically measured both directly through mea-
surements of the tax base, tax rates, rate of compliance and costs
of administration, for example, and indirectly through other crite-
ria of a purely economic nature, such as GNP, rate of inflation,
capital investments, savings, etc. 142 Thus, these "empirical crite-
ria", because they are the only measures of applied taxation, are
the only "tools" available with which to evaluate and shape the
tax system. Accordingly, the goals of tax policy must be framed in
terms of empirical criteria. By monitoring such empirical criteria
while adjusting the tax system, the relative performance of alter-
native tax schemes could be measured and the tax system could
be verifiably improved.
This suggests how tax policy might be put into practice, but it
still does not answer the question of how to set the objective goals
of tax policy, without which the empirical measures of perform-
ance would be meaningless. In order to develop a coherent tax
policy, which is necessary in order to make tax policy normative,
the objective goals of tax policy must be refined from the two fun-
damental rules of taxation. If the purpose of the tax system is to
raise revenue, the objective of tax policy must be to maximize the
utility of the tax system, but there are practical limits to the bur-
140. Id.
141. Id. at 748.
142. Some empirical research is now being done to determine whether up-
per-income taxpayers are paying a greater share of the tax burden after the tax
cuts of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. See Kiefer, An Economic Analysis
of the Kemp/Roth Tax Cut Bill, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE TAX REVOLT (A. Laffer &
J. Seymour eds. 1979); Minarik, The Tax Shares Boomlet, 23 TAX NOTES 1218
(1984); Schuyler, The Misdirected Debate on the "Fairness" of the 1981 Tax Reductions,
24 TAX NOTES 799 (1984); Veder & Watel, The Impact of Marginal Income Tax Rate
Changes in the United States, 1954-82, 25 TAX NOTES 711 (1984); Vedder & Gallo-
way, Soaking the Rich Through Tax Cuts, Wall St.J., Mar. 31, 1985, at 26, col. 3; L.
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den that can be placed on a tax base. This means that if there is a
predetermined tax base, tax policy should have as its goal the
maximization of revenue within the limits of the base's taxable
capacity; or if there is a specific revenue requirement (which in
practice would always be the case), tax policy should try to extract
that amount of revenue from the available tax base with the least
impact. In other words, instead of seven general criteria and un-
countable specific criteria entering into each decision, all tax pol-
icy would be made on the basis of the efficient collection of
revenue.
While this may appear to be simply another description of an
"ideal tax," this formulation actually states a coherent, albeit
complex, calculus. Because the objective of tax policy is to maximize the
utility of the tax system, the only adverse effects of taxation that tax policy
can legitimately be concerned with are those that redound to the tax system
itself Consequently, the degree of normative guidance that can
be achieved by taking a pragmatic approach to tax policy will de-
pend upon how precisely efficiency can be quantified in terms of
the "empirical criteria" that meaningfully relate to tax system
performance. Exactly what variables would enter into such a
"calculus of utility" would have to be worked out experientially,
but essentially it means that decisions of tax policy should be made ac-
cording to how they affect the rates, tax base, taxable unit and cost of ad-
ministering the tax system. 143
Such a proposal plainly invites two questions: 1) Is a calculus
of utility theoretically possible? and 2) Is a tax system based on a
calculus of utility politically possible? In answer to the first ques-
tion, the integration of a calculus of utility would unquestionably
be complex. And of course it could never be integrated to the
point where a formula would mechanically yield the definitive tax
base, rate structure and coefficient of administration cost-effec-
tiveness. Nevertheless, the relationship of and between those
variables and the empirical criteria by which the performance of
the tax system can be measured is real. Therefore, such a calculus
should be theoretically possible. 144
143. These factors affect the direct measurement. For example, when capi-
tal investment and GNP increase, so does the tax base. The purely economic
indirect measurements, would also be important, because they affect the efficient
collection of revenue.
144. Equilibrium simulation models have recently been used for empirical
research into the efficiency cost of taxes and changes on the tax structure, such
as raising the marginal tax rates. See Gravelle, NON-NEUTRAL TAXATION OF DE-
PRECIATING ASSETS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO THE UNITED
STATES, 189 (1981) (NIA-TIA, Proceedings of the Seventy-Fourth Annual Con-
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Evidence that such a calculus is possible is found in the "Laf-
fer curve," itself a rudimentary calculus of utility. Basically, the
"Laffer curve" is an economic graph (derived from historical
analysis) which suggests there are two tax rates (between zero and
one hundred percent) which will produce the same amount of
revenue from a given economy: a high rate, which is regressive
and thus retards economic growth, thereby impacting the tax base
and thus, total revenue; and a lower rate, which is correspond-
ingly less regressive and thus allows greater growth, which in turn
results in a larger base, which compensates for the reduced tax
rate. The parameters of the Laffer curve have never been quanti-
fied, and it has been harshly criticized for being overly simplistic.
Nevertheless, its significance should not be overlooked. That
such a curve has normative implications is plain-an efficient tax
system should tax at the lower rate. In spite of its simplicity, the
Laffer Curve has been described as a powerful analytical tool with
great political relevance, which is hard to refute since it has al-
ready had a significant impact on federal tax policy.' 45 Thus, the
Laffer Curve illustrates both the nature and the potential of a
calculus of utility.
While a pragmatic tax policy based on how decisions affect
the tax rates, tax base, taxable unit and cost of administration
might be criticized as appearing to be politically unfeasible be-
cause of its narrow scope, this criticism would be unwarranted be-
cause it is far from narrow. A calculus relating those variables
would be sensitive to both public reaction and macro-economics,
in short, to the whole political-economic environment in which it
must operate. But before discussing "feasibility", the issue of
"total revenue" should be briefly addressed.
Notably, and perhaps surprisingly, total revenue is not a part
of the tax policy calculus that must be balanced. The total reve-
nue goal is set as a matter of fiscal policy and then is imposed on
the tax system as a constant. Of course, tax policy considerations
go into the fiscal policy equation with respect to setting the reve-
nue-debt ratio of financing total expenditures, and thus they in-
ference); Ballard, Shoven & Whalley, The Total Welfare Cost of the United States Tax
System: A General Equilibrium Approach, 38 NAT'L TAX. J. 125 (1985).
145. See A. LAFFER &J. SEYMOUR, THE ECONOMICS OF THE TAX REVOLT 14-
18 (1979). For a further explanation of the "Laffer curve" and its political
ramifications, see Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, and the "Laffer Curve, "PUB. INTEREST
3-16 (Winter 1978). The Laffer curve has been credited as being the theoretical
foundation of the Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981, which implemented the
largest tax cuts in the history of the federal income tax system.
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fluence what the total revenue target will be. But the revenue
target is not per se an element of tax policy. Hence, total revenue
is only a factor in developing tax policy insofar as tax policy must
juggle the tax rates, tax base and administrative costs to efficiently
raise the prescribed revenue.
But is a pragmatic tax policy politically feasible? In other
words, would it make good political sense, which is not to ask, will
it actually be implemented?1 46 Although it is beyond the scope of
this paper to try to refine a calculus of utility and apply it, the
shape of a pragmatic tax policy and the resultant tax system
should nevertheless be evident. The major change obviously
would be that the tax system would no longer serve as a vehicle
for social and economic policies unrelated to the administration
of the system itself, which is not as politically radical a proposal as
it might appear. 147
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal income tax system is currently under attack from
all quarters. Its inadequacies are manifold. But the tax system
merely reflects tax policy; tax policy itself, in the aggregate, is in-
articulable and theoretically incoherent. The general belief is
that the tax system, and thus, tax policy, needs comprehensive
and radical reform. But topical tax policy and tax system reforms
have been tried over and over without success. In the past, it
seems that for each step forward, tax reform has taken two steps
backwards. What is needed, therefore, is reform that can break
the pattern of failure.
The thesis presented in this paper asserts that past attempts
at reform have failed because the classic "theoretical" approach
to taxation yields theoretical criteria of income tax policy that can
never be normative in any meaningful sense. Accordingly, the
theoretical approach must be abandoned and a "pragmatic" ap-
proach must be adopted. Essentially, a pragmataic approach sim-
146. The focus of this paper is on administrative rather than political feasi-
bility. It is the author's view that except for the elimination of the charitable and
mortgage home deductions and the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the
gross estate of the decedent, the tax system proposed is politically feasible.
147. The strongest argument that a pragmatic tax policy is politically feasi-
ble exists in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The underlying philosophy of the Act
contained therein is patently pragmatic. Its purpose is to eliminate, to a greater
or lesser extent, special tax policies in order to broaden the tax base and reduce
tax rates, all with an aim to increase the economic and administrative efficiency
of the tax system. See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 601(a), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.).
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plifies tax policy by restricting it to considerations of efficient
revenue raising. In designing a successful tax system, this is more
objective than the other criteria that have heretofore influenced
tax policy, so there is no reason to consider others. Through a
pragmatic approach, tax specialists can develop a "calculus of
utility" around "empirical criteria" related to tax system perform-
ance. However, a calculus of utility and empirical criteria are no
more the stones by which philosophers magically reveal the defin-
itive tax structure than were theoretical criteria. Because the
economy is dynamic, so must the tax system be dynamic as well.
But together, a calculus of utility and empirical criteria forge a
nexus between policy and practice, and thus are the tools of a
pragmatic tax policy by which the tax system can be intelligently
and successfully reformed.
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